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Oct. 30,

INDUS'rRIAL INDEMNI'I'Y COMPANY
Corporation)
GOJ_,DEN STATB COMPANY,
, et
Defendants; G. W.
DRAY AGE & RIGGING
INC.
Defendants and
; '!'HE
ROBITIHT L. JOHNSON CORPORATION (a Corpora, Intervener and
Insurance--Reciprocal Insurers--Transfers.-In an action for
relief regarding the rights of nonconsenting subscribers of a reciprocal insurance exchange under an agreement
its business to plaintiff indemnity company,
from the placement of policies by former subscribers of the exchange with the company were not part of the
business or assets of the exchange, and it was not unfair and inequitable to allow the company to keep the claimed profits,
where expert witnesses showed that, in evaluating the business
a.nd assets of an established insurance business, the future
profits or prospective earnings are never taken into account,
and where insurance brokers testified that the transfer agreement had no influence on their decisions to place business with
the company, that they knew the company and exchange had
had the same management and when the exchange went out of
business they placed their business with the company for that
reason, but they also stated that they would not have done so
if they cou1d have obtained a better "deal" elsewhere, and that
some business was placed with the company at the client's request because of ownership interest in the company.
!d.-Reciprocal Insurers Transfers.-In an action for declaratory relief regarding the rights of nonconsenting subscribers of
a reciprocal insurance exchange under an agreement transferring its business to plaintiff indemnity company, findings that a
partnership acting as attorney for the exchange was entitled to
receive a percentage of premiums for its services as attorneyin-fact, that the subscribers had no right to these fees, that
the company agreed to perform the obligations for the attorney
and was assigned the right to receive the unpaid attorney fees,
and that these fees constituted no part of the business or assets
of the exchange, were supported by evidence of an underwriters agreement under which the attorney-in-fact had full power
[1) See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 99 et seq.
McK. Dig. References:
Insurance, § 10.5; [4] Damages,

§ 34;

Parties, § 25.

C.2d
and to enforce
same way as an individual
agreement which
thnt the company would reinsure
all
policies and
all obligations of the
exchange und(lr the terms of the policies, each of which incorporated the underwriters' agreement, and by a document
executed bPtween the attorney and the company whereby the
Mvrnr•nn'" assumed the obligations of the attorney and the attorney
its rights to the management fees.
[3] Id.-·Reciprocal Insurers-Transfers.-In an action for declaratory relief regarding the
of nonconsenting subscribers
of a reciprocal insurance
under an agreement transferring its business to plaintiff indemnity company, the trial
court did not err in holding that a special surplus fund was not
a part of the business or assets of the exchange, where it appeared from an underwriters' agreement that a partnership
acting as attorney for the exchange was entitled to the fund "if
Exchange discontinues business" as compensation for winding
up the affairs and liquidation and that the exchange had been
discontinued; and a further finding that this fund was assigned
to the company as compensation for work performed in connection with the liquidation of the exchange, less the portion
required to reimburse the attorney for future costs of liquidation, and that the subscribers had no right or claim to this
surplus since it was not a part of the exchange's business or
assets, was proper and did not result in the company being
unjustly or unfairly enriched, where the benefits it thereby
received did not arise as a consequence of the transfer agreement, but as a result of the attorney's determination not to
issue any new policies.
[4] Damages-Interest.-In an equitable proceeding, the matter
of awarding or withholding interest is within the sound discretion of the court, and interest should be awarded only when
such an award is fair and equitable under the facts of
the case; in an action for declaratory relief regarding the
rights of nonconsenting subscribers of a reciprocal insurance
exchange under an agreement transferring its business to
plaintiff indemnity company, the court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow interest on an award to defendants where it found that the company had not acted in bad
faith.
[5] Parties-Intervention-Stat.us of Intervener.-In a stockholders' derivative action interveners are but volunteers in the
main original cause, and their counsel may not participate in
the presentation of the main case save as counsel for the main
stoekholders may consent or the court may permit; the court
is not bound to permit the intervention of others of the same
class if their interests are properly protected.
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APPEALS from a
of the Superior Court of the
and County of San Francisco. Albert C. Wollenberg,
Affirmed.
Action for
the rights of nonsubscribers
insurance exchange
under an agreement
business to plaintiff incompany, in which a cross-complaint for restitution
was
Judgment
restitution to defendants for
amount less than that
affirmed.
Kearney & Fargo, Frank B. Belcher, Kenny &
Robert W. Kenny, Jerome Politzer, Morris E. Cohn
and Hyman & Hyman for Defendants and Appellants.
Park Chamberlain and Earl C. Berger for Intervener and
Appellant.
Marrin, Johnson & Bridges and Edward J. Ruff for
Respondents.
McCOMB, J .-Industrial Indemnity Exchange (hereinafter
referred to as Exchange) was a reciprocal insurance organization handling workmen's compensation insurance. Industrial Indemnity Company (hereinafter referred to as Comalso handled workmen's compensation insurance. There
was considerable interrelation between Exchange and Combut no competition. Industrial Underwriters (hereinreferred to as Attorney) was the managing entity of
Exchange and Company.
In a reciprocal exchange the participants, called underwriters or subscribers, exchange insurance contracts for their
mutual protection through the medium of an attorney-in-fact,
who also sets rates, settles losses, compromises claims and
cancels contracts. Attorney acted in this capacity for Exchange under an agreement known as Underwriters Agreement. In return for its services it received a percentage of
the premiums deposited by the subscribers and was required
to furnish offices and personnel for Exchange's operations out
of this percentage.
Attorney, a partnership with substantially the same stock
ownership as Company, also furnished offices and personnel
for the latter. The Insurance Commissioner objected to the
411 c.2d-8

elimination
bination of their activities.
An agreement was entered into
the

h<>l·w''""

~onon"n"

and Exwould be

would service
subscribers

an amount
as determined by such run-out.
Consents were obtained from 98 per cent of the subscribers
of Exchange to this agreement.
Subsequently
an action for declaratory
relief regarding the rights of the nonconsenting subscribers.
were filed
sevzora.l sets of these subscribers.
After trial,
was rendered in favor of Company, and
the cross-complaints were ordered. dismissed.
'l'\VO separate sets of defendants
(1) G. vV. Thomas
Drayage and Rigging Company, Inc .. W. H. BaHinger and
Son, a corporation, and .Minna M. Ballinger (hereinafter referred to as defendant Thomas Drayage and Rigging Company), and (2) Robert L. Johnson Corporation, for itself
and as representative of all similarly situated co-owner subscribers of Exc.hangc (hereinafter referred to as defendant
,Johnson Corporation).
On appeal it was held that the contract between Company
and Exchange was m(~gal and void in violation of section
llOl of the Insurance Code. (Industrial Indem. Co. v. Golden
State Co., 117 Cal.App.2c1 519 [256 P.2d 677].) 'fhe appellate
court (1) reversc~d the judgment in favor of Company and
remanded the caRe to the trial court with directions to deny
all declaratory relief to plaintiffs, and (2) stated that "in
the cross-actions, relief will be granted rto appellants] only
with respect to the consequences of the illegality of the transfer and assumption
. . . . " (See p. 540.) It then
directed the trial court to
defendants "such relief as
the court will deem fit to enable them to recover in their representative capacity for subscribers the bus1:ness and assets obtained by Company in consequence
the agreement herein
held to be -invalid . . . . "
pp. 540-541.) (Italics added.)
After the reversal of the trjal court's judgment defendant
Johnson Corporation filed a
for judgment and decree
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of the effect of the
court's remittitur. Defendant Thomas Drayage and Rigging
moved to strike this petition upon the ground that
Johnson
was a mere ''intervenor'' and as such
not entitled to act on terms of
with the other defendants. 'rhis motion was
the
Thereafter
was entered in favor of the defendants in the
this
both defendant
and defendant Johnson
APPEAL OF DEFENDANT 'rHOMAS DRAYAGE AND RIGGING
COMPANY

In view of the former decision on appeal the trial court was
limited to a determination of this issue: What bttsiness and
assets were obtained by Company in conseq1tence of the" Transand Assumption Agreement"?
There can be no question that the "agreement" held to be
invalid referred to the Transfer and Assumption Agreement
that was the basis of the litigation. An examination of the
record discloses that the following findings of fact are sustained by substantial evidence:
"IV. Coincident with the issuance to Underwriters of
the Certificate of Authority to act in liquidation of the Exchange, and on November 4, 1953, Company transferred to
Underwriters and Underwriters accepted on behalf of Exchange and its subscribers, and with the approval of the Advisory Committee of Exchange, all of the business, property
and assets of Exchange remaining in its hands after satisfaction of liabilities of the Exchange and which had been received
by Company in consequence of the Transfer and Assumption
Agreement. Underwriters has thereafter at all times continued in possession of and presently holds such business.
property and assets for distribution to the subscribers of the
Exchange in liquidation of its business and affairs. As of
March
1954, the net worth, representing the excess of assets over liabil#,ies, inclttding reserves for logses incttrrcd and
to be inctLrrcd, of the bu.siness. property and assets so transferred, exclttsive of the
Surpl11s Acconnt, wa,s $!323,300.39. (Italics added.)
"V. The
and assets of Exchange received by
in consequence of the Transfer and
Assumption Agreement and thereafter transferred to Underwriters as found herein, included all assets and liabilities of
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lill,Cl:llancge as reflected on the balance sheet of December 31,
1948, and which thereafter arose or accrued and all policies
of insurance in force on the books of the Exchange as of
December 31, 1948, and the entire
thereon including the development of claims and
All of the business, property and assets of JCJAc1uux~
acter received by Company from
at any time, aud
all value attributable thereto have been returned by Company
to Underwriters and are included within the net worth as set
forth in Paragraph IV of these Findings. The business,
property and assets of Exchange do not include any policies
written by the Company after December 31, 1948, for or on
behalf of any former subscribers of Exchange and the net
worth as set forth in Paragraph IV of the findings does not
reflect any value with regard to such policies and no accounting of any profits made by Company on such policies is any
part of these findings.
"VI. Under the provisions of the Transfer and Assumption Agreement, Company, with regard to policies of insurance
in force in the Exchange as of December 31, 1948, took over
for its own account that portion of the 1948 policy year occurring after December 31, 1948, and under the provisions
of the Transfer and Assumption Agreement no adjustment
was to be made to the net worth of the Exchange payable
to the subscribers with regard to tbis portion of the experience
on those policies. That portion of the 1948 policy year taken
over by Company for its own account developed to be unprofitable. This loss amounted to $156,600.53. All policies
of insurance in force with Exchange as of December 31, 1948
and the entire experience on those policies, including the experience on the entire 1948 policy year, and the entire experience on policies previously issued by Exchange and expired on December 31, 1948, are a part of the business and
assets of the Exchange and because of the invalidity of the
Transfer and Assumption Agreement are for the account of
the Exchange. This entire experience on policies of insurance in force with Exchange as of December 31. 1948, as
well as the entire experience on policies previously issued by
Exchange and expired on Decemb?r 31. 1948, is reflected in
the amount of net worth as set forth in Paragraph IV of these
Findings.
"VII. All policies of insuranee at any time issued by the
Exchange, including those in force as of December 31, 1948,
were issued subject and pursuant to the terms and provisions
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an Underwriters'
executed by each of the subGnder the terms of such Underwriters' Agreement,
true copy of which has been received in evidence as DefGnda uts' Exhibit No. 6, Underwriters was appointed as At'orney-in-Fact and was entitled to receive as its fee 25 per
'~nt of all
premium deposits received and 5 per
of all
credited to each subscriber. The subscribers
any of them did not at any time have any right to any por1ion of il1ese fees to be
to Underwriters and such fees
were at all times the property of Underwriters or its assignee.
The Underwriters' Agreements have at all times been in full
force and effect with regard to all policies of insurance issued
or on behalf of Exchange.
"VIII. By written agreement dated January 2, 1949, a
true copy of which has been received in evidence as Plaintiffs'
Exhibit No. 3, following the execution of the Transfer and
Assumption Agreement, Company agreed to perform for
Underwriters after January 1, 1949, all of Underwriters'
obligations relating to policies of insurance at any time issued
Exchange and Underwriters transferred to Company its
rights to receive fees under the Underwriters' Agreement and
as yet unpaid. Company performed all services required by
it to be performed under such agreement. Following the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Company and Underwriters without notice to the defendants and cross-complainants G. W. 'rhomas Drayage & Rigging Company, Inc.,
W. R. Ballinger & Son. a corporation, and Minna M. Ballinger,
terminated and cancelled the agreement of January 2, 1949,
and without notice to the defendants and cross-complainants
G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company, Inc., W. R.
Ballinger & Son, a corporation, and Minna M. Ballinger,
executed a written agreement dated November 15, 1953, a true
copy of which has been received in evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4, acknowledging paymeut to Company of fees payable to Underwriters under said Underwriters Agreements
and releasing Company of all claims by Underwriters to any
fees theretofore collected by Company. All of such Attorneyin-Fact's fees have been properly taken into account in computing the net worth referred to in Paragraph IV of these
findings and the subscribers have no right to any portion of
such fees paid to or received, directly or indirectly, by Company or Underwriters and they do not constitute any part of
the business, property or assets of Exchange to which the subscribers are entitled.

~;cribers.

1

C.2d

insurance agents or brokers who were free to
business with such insurance carriers as they chose.
cision as to the
of any
of workmen's cominto
and
an insurance
any one
year did not mean that it would be
in a
year.
"XIV. All
after December 31,
persons, firms or corporations who had
of Exchange
were voluntarily
as new items of
business by insurance agents or brokers who were free to
place such policies with such insurauee carrier as they chose.
The decision as to the placement of such policies of workmen's
compensation insurance is made each year by the insurance
agent or broker as a new item of business, taking into consideration all elements of coverage, cost, management and
other relevant matters. 'l'he placement of a policy of insurance with Company in any one year does not mean that it
will be placed with Company in any succeeding year. In view
of these circumstances surrounding the placement of business,
it cannot be determined and there is no evidence that any of
these policies will be placed with the Company in the future.
None of these pol.icies was placed with Company by reason
of or as a consequence of activities of Company being performed under, or arisi11.g as a consequence of, the Transfer
and Ass1lmption Agreement or because Company was regarded
in any sense as being the snccessor of Exchange. All policies
placed with Company were so placed because the coverage,
cost and service afforded by management of Company was
attractive to the policyholder and insurance agent or broker.
(Italics added.)
"XVIII. Company did not use, succeed to or receive for
its own account new or different information concerning past
or prospective policyholders or succeed to or receive any new
or different management, name, insignia, goodwill or agency
plant from Exchange as a consequence of the Transfer and
Assumption Agreement, nor did it at any time or in any
manner receive any management, name, insignia, goodwill or
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or
subscribers of
In connection with its business of insurance manUnderwriters out of its own funds
and
an
and
of this

"XXII. No
of insurance are any
of the bmdness,
or assets of
those policies of
insurance which had beel'i
and were in force on
the books of Exchange and no value is to be given to nor
allowance made for any prospective business not in force on
the books of Exchange on December 31,
in determining
the business, property or assets of Exchange.
"XXVI. It is not true that the compensation paid or to
be
to or for the account of Attorney-in-Fact under the
provisions of the Underwriters' Agreements is in any amount
or for any period any part of the business, property or assets
of the Exchange or the subscribers to the Exchange.
"XXX. It is not true that any policies of insurance written or to be written by Industrial Indemnity Company on or
after January 1, 1949, or at any time for, with, or on behalf
of persons, firms or corporations who were former subscribers
of the Exchange or any other persons, firms or corporations,
or the profits therefrom or net earnings or any earnings thereon are or were any part of the business, property or assets of
the Exchange or the subscribers of the Exchange or are any
part of the business, property or assets of Exchange obtained
by Company in consequence of the Transfer and Assumption
Agreement.
"XXXI. It is not true that there are any other assets not
yet discovered or identified which constitute business, property
or assets of the Exchange or which were the business, property or assets of Exchange on December 31, 1948, or at any
other time and which are not reflected in the net worth as
referred to in Paragraph IV of these
and it is true
that all of the business, property and assets of the Exchange
and all of the business, property and assets of Exchange
received by Company in consequence of the Transfer and
Assumption Agreement are now in the possession of the Exchange,
to the control of the
Committee of
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the Exchange, Underwriters and the Insurance Commissioner
of the State of California and are reflected in the net worth
as set forth in Paragraph IV of these findings."
It logically follows that since the trial court's findings are
supported by evidence and covered the issues the appellate
court had ordered retried, the judgment in the principal
amount should be affirmed.
Defendant Thomas Drayage and
Company urges
the following contentions, which are without merit:
[1] First: That the profits arising from the placement of
policies by former Exchange subscribers with Company were
part of the business or assets of Exchange.
The trial court found that none of the profits arising from
the placement of policies by former Exchange subscribers
with Company was part of the business or assets of Exchange.
(See Findings IV, V, XIII, XIV, XXII and XXX, supra.)
Defendant does not attack these findings on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence, but on the ground that it is
unfair and inequitable to allow Company to keep the claimed
profits. This contention is unsound. The testimony of two
expert witnesses showed that in evaluating the business and
assets of an established insurance business, future profits or
prospective earnings are never taken into account. In other
words, there is no value placed upon the possibility of future
earnings.
The reason is succinctly stated by one witness, Mr. Best, as
follows: "Now, in the writing of that type of business [workmen's compensation] there is never any right of a policyholder
to demand that his policy be renewed, there is never any right
on the part of the company to demand that that policyholder
renew his policy with that company. The business, in fact, is
controlled first of all by the policyholder himself. He decides
where he wants to put it. Then he hires a broker or agent to
look after it, and he has a considerable say as to just where
that business is to go, that is to what carrier company or reciprocal or what have you. Then finally the company gets the
business. It happens that in that particular field there is a
tremendous shifting from company to company as these annual policies expire. I had occasion to observe that particular
matter, which is very striking. There is great competition
for those big policies, and company A may have it this year
and company B gets it next year and company C gets it the
third year and so forth, so it is a transitory sort of business,
and not only that, but actually in such a business every year's
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so,
and it
well understood that whoever carries the risk is
entitled to the
and to any
that results because
carries the risk and must bear the
if there is a loss,
has
been considered that
the business that is
the books at
the valuation is
be made can be
future business itself is too uncertain.
the
of witnesses
Hullin,
all of whom are brokers of workmen's compensation
the questioned findThey testified that
are reviewed annually, about
two months before the
date, loss experience is
"u"'"""'A• the current market is also checked for risk-loss ratio,
etc.; that they
to "make
brackets,
the best deal they can" for their clients; that the practice
and custom of the ''American
'' is that the
brokers ''own'' the
their customer list; and that
the broker and carrier know the
dates. Being
the "owner," the broker is free to
the busines!'l where
he wishes on expiration. Each witness testified that he had
placed business with Company, had placed it previously with
business with other companies.
Exchange, and had also
They also stated that the Transfe1' and
Agreement
had no influence whatwhereby Company took over
ever on their rlecisions to
Several witnesses testified
lmew Company and
Exchange had had the sanw
and when Exchange
went out of business
business with Company
for that reason, but they also
that they would not have
done so if they could have obtained a better "deal" elsewhere.
There was also
that some business was placed with
Company at the client's
because of mvnership interest
in Company. Defendant
that seven other named
brokers would testify
Defendant made no
to rebut the foregoing testimony
and produced no witnesses who testifierl to the contrary. Defendant's argument appears to be that even though future
profits are not and were not an asset of Exchange, Company
shoulrl not be allo·wcrl to
tlv::m, not because there is any
evidence of bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, mishandling

these
account of
of Exchange.
The evidence

assets
the

Agreement; and
sumed the
rights to the
fees.
that the Underwriters
The trial court was correct in
Agreement remained in effect and covered all policies written
in 1948. The Transfer and
did nor.
expressly or impliedly supersede the Underwriters Agreement.
Under the Underwriters
the Attorney-in-Fact had
full power to reinsure; it also had full power to enforce rights
and discharge liabilities in the same way as an individual
subscriber could do.
The Transfer and Assumption Agreunent provided tl1n:
Company would reinsure all outstanding policies and would
perform all the
of Exchange under the terms of
the policies. The
was a part of each
policy written.
The
for insurance with Exchange provided :
"This application if
to the foregoing statements and declarations and is further
to the conditions of the
which are made a part
hereof and which are
the
as follows:
. . . " Thereafter follows the Underwriters Agreement. The
last clause of the
: '"rhis agreement is
strictly limited to the use and purposes herein expressed and
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account shall be
credit returned."
"'"''""''""''''" did not ~nv~.~~+
to terminate the

in-Fact
to the
time hereafter assert any

and agreements
the Attorneyit may have in and
and will not at any
whatever in or to said special

"

to the Transfer Agreement did not intend
the Underwriters
is evidenced by
executed between
and Company on
to perform and
Hr'~"c" with respect to the
insurance issued
assigned to Company its
thereunder and
that it would not "at
any time make any claim whatever that it is entitled to the
whole or any
of the account designated as 'Special
as shown on the books of the
as of the
close of business on December
1948.'
There is no contention that the services were not performed
in accordance with the
or that
did not
have a
to
appears from the
Underwriters
Fees were never
may have
a
even
a consequence of the Transfer
That the trial court erred in
that the
Fund was not a
of the business or assets
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The

: ''A Special Surwhich shall be set aside all
investment income it shall
fund and no part thereof
of any individual subscriber;
shall be credited to the
it shall be used for the benefit of the
as the AdInsurance Commissioner,
the expense of, and as
the trial court
Fund was, under the Underreserved for expenses incurred in
connection with liquidation and
to Attorney; that
'-111 November 15,
this was assigned to Company as compensation for work heretofore performed in connection with
the liquidation of
less such portion as required to
reimburse Attorney for future costs of liquidation; and that
the subscribers have no right or claim to this surplus since it
was not a part of
's business or assets. (Finding
IX.•)
After the District Court of Appeal's first decision, Attorney and Company entered into an agreement restoring the
business and assets of Exchange to Attorney as Attorney-inFact of Exchange, subject to Attorney's obtaining a certificate
of authority from the Insurance Commissioner. Thereafter
such a certificate was issued for the limited purpose of discharging the obligations under the policies and Underwriters
*Finding IX reads: "Under the terms of the Underwriters' Agreements, Exchange at all times maintained a Special Surplus Fund consisting of all investment income received on Exchange funds; this fund,
in the event Exchange discontinues business and after full provision for
liabilities to the satisfaction of the Insurance Commissioner, is to be
paid to Underwriters to defray the expenses of and as compensation for
liquidation. The amount of this fund as of March 31, 1954, was
written agreement dated November 15,
$592,322.31. Underwriters
1953, a true copy of which
been received in evidence as Plaintiffs'
Exhibit No. 38, has agreed without notice to the defendants and crosscomplainants G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company, Inc., W. R
Ballinger & Son, a corporation, and Minna M. Ballinger, to pay to
Company as compensation for work heretofore performed by Company
on behalf of Underwriters in connection with the liquidation of the
Exchange, a sum equal to the
surplus which Underwriters may
less such portion of
special surplus as may be required
to
Underwriters for incurred and future costs of liquidation.
The subscribers of
have no
or claim to any portion of
this special surplus and it
not
any part of the business,
property or assets of the Exchange to which the subscribers are en-

titled."

between
and
,
"The Attorney-in-Fact
further agrees that it will not at any time make any claim
whatever that it is entitled to the whole or any portion of
the account designated as '
' as shown on the
books of the Exchange as of the close of business on December
1948."
Defendant ai:gues that Company waived its rights to this
fund. The trial court found otherwise. After the first decision of the District Court of Appeal, Company reasserted its
right to the fund in its answer to defendant's petition for
retrial.
Under the Underwriters Agreement, Attorney-in-Fact was
entitled to this fund "if Exchange discontinues business,"
as compensation for
up the affairs and liquidation.
The question then arises whether Exchange has been ''discontinued." 'fhE: trial court found that it had, and the evidence supports the
It is to be noted that the Insurance Commissioner issued
the certificate of authority
to the extent necessary to
wind up the affairs of Exchange. Exchange has no authority
to issue new policies. Since the sum is not a part of the assets
of Exchange, it is clear that the trial court's disposition of it
was correct.
It is also to be noted that defendant does not claim the
policy contract, which included the Underwriters Agreement,
Yl'as unfair or that the
(subscribers of Exchange) had been taken advantage of by Company. The 1948
policyholders were in no sense injured nor was Company
unfairly enriched at their expense.
Defendant's arguments to the
are unsupported by
the record. The court
and the evidence amply supports
the finding, that future
Attorney Fees and the Special

of an
that any such
under
terms of the Underwriters'
ments and the
of insurance issued to
the power to cancel any such
of insurance and to
terminate the Underwriters'
at any time upon ten
days' notice and in the event of such
Underwriters had the
to
the subscribers' account and
return any funds
the subscribers' credit. The
Underwriters'
the
Attorney-in-Fact could be
"XII. Prior to December
Committee of the
knowledge and approval of the
Exchange determined that it would not thereafter issue any
new policies of insurance in the
and no such policies
have been issued. All
of insurance issued to subscribers of Exchange
their terms on or before
has
December 31, 1949. Since December
been engaged in no business
for the liquidation of
Exchange.''
The foregoing findings, which are not disputed, show that
defendant and the other 1948 policyholders have not been
injured by the execution of the Transfer and Assumption
Agreement, and that they have received all to which they were
entitled. Therefore,
have not suffered either injury or
damage.
However, defendant claims that
should be deprived of the benefits it received as a result
the discontinuance of business by
This claim is based upon the
contention that Company has been
riched. The evidence does not
1948 and several years
wrote the
largest volume of
workmen's compensation insurance carriers in
When Attorney
uernc1,uu

to, or
519,
the court found that "
did not use,
succeed to or receive for its own account new or different
information
or
policyholders or
succeed to or receive any new or different management, name,
or agency
from
as a consequence of the Transfer and
nor did
it at any time or in any manner receive any management,
name,
or agency
which was a part
of the
or assets of or belonged to the substtzJra.)
either
to or as a causeTransfer and Assumption Agreement,
over any other carrier in the
from the record that under the
'' as
and in use in the
the renewals or expirations
are owned by the
or broker, and not by
carrier. It is thus evident that Company has
enriched.
claims the trial court erred in not
The trial court's position was
interest on the
and the rule is
correct. This was an
the matter of awarding or
settled that in such a
interest is within the sound discretion of the
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trial

and cases cited in nn. 60 and
In the
trial court found that
had
and therefore we cannot say it abused
"""f'n<:iinrr
allow interest on the award.
APPEAL oF DEFENDANT JOHNSON CoRPORATION

[5] Defendant Johnson
contends that its
cross-complaint was
This contention is not sound. In a stockholders' derivative
action interveners are but volunteers in the main original
cause, and their counsel may not
in the presentation of the main case save as counsel for the main stockholders
(Mann v. Superior
may consent or the court may
Oaurl, 53 Cal.App.2d 272, 280 [2] [127 P.2d 970] [hearing
denied by the
Court] . )
In the present case the trial court was not bound to permit
the intervention of others of the same class if their interests
were properly protected. So far as the record discloses here,
defendant Johnson Corporation's interests were fully and
properly protected, and therefore the trial court did not err
in dismissing its cr<)SS-co'm]placint.
In view of our conclusions it is unnecessary to discuss other
questions argued by counsel.
The judgment and orders are each affirmed.
Shenk,

Schauer,

and Spence,

concurred.

SCHAUER, J.-I concur. It is my view that the issues of
law have been, as
discussed and correctly
by Mr. Justice McComb.
disposed of in the
Nevertheless, because
diverges sharply among some
of the justices, it appears proper to briefly supplement our
discussion.
In the arguments for the ausse:nt1ng theory, respondents
That term is ordinarily
have been termed
connotive of evil intent as well as
act. Under any permissible view of the record the term seems to me to be an
unduly harsh
to be
AB appears from the
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of the District Court of Appeal on the first appeal
in this case (lndustriallndem. Co. v. Golden State Co. (1953),
527 [256 P.2d 677]}, the issue of il117 Cal.App.2d
legality of the Transfer and Assumption Agreement by reason
of the then provisions of section 1101 of the Insurance Code
was injected into the case by that court. Until then respondents were willing and fully intended to carry out their obligations under that agreement, which would have meant that the
subscribers would have received $1,018,589.07, rather than
only the $323,300.39 awarded them by the judgment which is
now being affirmed. Despite this situation, the president of
Company, who is also one of the partners of Attorney, testified that, regardless of the outcome of the case, it was the
intention of respondents to pay the subscribers an amount
equivalent to that which the subscribers would have received
under the Transfer and Assumption Agreement, less costs
of litigation. I believe that this further demonstrates the
good faith of respondents, already conclusively shown, 1 and
1
lt is to be remembered that it is established that the Transfer and
Assumption Agreement was entered into in good faith and had the
approval of the msurance commissioner. Obviously, in the conduct of
respondents, there was no union of act and evil intent. The opinion
of the District Court of Appeal on the first appeal (Industrial lndem.
Co. v. Golden State Co. (19.53), supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 519) carefully
notes many significant facts. Pertinent to the discussion, the opinion
reads:
"[P. 526] The court found in nearly all respects for the plaintiffs and
against the cross-complainants . . . The judgment declared in substance
that past subscribers had no interest in the Exchange and were not
entitled to participate in any distribution; that the transfer and assumption agreement was fair and equitable, validly executed and binding on
all past and present subscribers of Exchange, and that they had no
right to any net worth or assets of Exchange except as provided in
said agreement, that said agreement distributed to the subscribere
all they were entitled to in the most equitable, reasonable and practical
manner and that subscribers had no interest in the business or assets of
Company . . .
"[P. 527] We have concluded that the original action for declaratory
relief should have been denied because the agreement to which it relates
is void as violating section llOl of the Insurance Code, expressly made
applicable to reciprocal exchanges by section 1282 of said code. Section 1101 reads insofar as applicable to this ~ase: 'An admitted insurer's officers, directors, trustees and any persons who have authority
in the management of the msnrer's funds. shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this coclc:
. ( <' '1 ['ir~ctly or indirectly purchase, or be
interested in the purchase of, any of the assets of the insurer.' Section
1106, Insurance Code, reads in part: 'Any person violating . . . Sections 1101, . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.'
''This exact point was not raised by any of the parties, but was
briefed specially at the request of this court . . . .
"[P. 534] In this case the court below made most elaborate findings
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evidences their
as set
in payment of
result under the
Uli~H<O"» to

go hand in hand :
and enforces
achieve
Nevertheless, that the enforcement of law does not
result
justly was
many
ago, when the concept
was born. As
in Owens v.
(1896), 113 Cal. "144. 450
33 L.R.A. 369], "the
law
to promote
justice, makes
., But, regrettably,
sometimes appear which not even the
reach of
can make
The
articulated in section 1101 of the Insurance
Code and relied upon
the District Court of
in
holding the Transfer and
to be illegal
and void was
justice. Its
application in this case seems to me,
to have resulted
in a judgment
understandably, some may feel on its
because of
face achieves the contrary, not so
the substance of the
now under consideration as beas to an circumstances on which it based its holding that the cross·
defendants have not brea.:,hed their fiduciary duty.
"[P. 5371 As we have held that the establishing of the circumstances
under which the Attorney
in workmen's compensation insurance
business of its own and the
of these circumstances in relation
to the duty of fairness and
incumbent on the Attorney as a
fiduciary were matters of fact. the decision of which by the trier of facts
is as a rule binding on
it seems evident that the findings stated
are fatal to the appeal
respect to the elaims of subscribers of
Exchange to the business of
unless appellants have shown
that they are not supported by
evidence. This they have failed
to do.
"[P. 539] Under these circumstances it is not for us to say that
the ultimate findings of the court below are necessarily improper in·
ferences nor can we hold as
matter of law, contrary to said findings,
that the
hreJwhed its fiduciary
to subRcribers when it
engaged in the
of workmen
insurance through the
medium of Compnny or thnt tlw
was in equity the
of
W c are the more
that this result is
profits of the business
any of Company's inthe subscribers of
Exchange a windfall
the setup
such Exchange."

; Pracnkel
P .2d
this connection it may be
noted that under a HJ;J5 amendment to
Insurance Code it
appears that such an agreernent as that whieh gave rise to the
current controversy may now be
made and performed,
thus
that no basic
of
policy, fairness, or justice was viol11ted when it was executed i.n 1948.
Neither that
nor enm the
of the
cited cases, could now affect the
first
I believe that the
now being affirmed
and
the facts, which is all that the court under the limitations of
the earlier holding could
and ihat the
out by
respondents of their
unenforceable but nevertheless
voluntarily self-recognized and now self-drelared obligations
under the 'l'ransfer and
this
to the most desirable conclusion which
concurred.

C. J.-I dissent.
the
of
the court fails to
to undisputed facts
no1•n,,.,.,. a transaction in violation of statute
as a consequence,
an
result.
The law of the case, as decided on
(Industrial Indem. Co. v. Golden State
519
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[256 P.2d 677]), is that the Transfer and Assumption Agreement by which Company took over the whole business of
Exchange was void because it violated section 1101 of the Insurance Code 1 and that the subscribers are entitled to recover
the business and assets obtained by Company as a consequence
of that agreement. The code section was designed to protect
persons such as the subscribers against the detrimental action
of those in a position like that of Attorney. The subscribers,
therefore, are not to be considered in pari delicto with Attorney and Company (Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33
Cal.2d 564, 574 [203 P.2d 758] ; see Lewis & Queen v. N. M.
Ball Sons, 48 CaL2d 141, 152 [308 P.2d 713] ), and the
latter are the parties legally responsible for the violation, even
if they acted in good faith.
It is undisputed, and the trial court found, that the Transfer and Assumption Agreement was considered fair and
equitable by Attorney and Company, that it was concluded
openly with the consent of the Insurance Commissioner and
of 98 per cent of the subscribers, and that the net worth of
Exchange which would have been distributed to subscribers
in accordance with the agreement, had it not been invalid,
would have amounted to $1,018,589.07. Nevertheless, the
judgment of the trial court affirmed by the majority awards
the subscribers no more than $323.300.39 as the value of the
business and assets of Exchange taken over by Company. Thus,
as the decision of the majority stands. those for whose protection the violated statute was enacted will receive less than
one-third of what would have been theirs under the agreement, whereas those who are responsible for the violation will
not only retain all of the benefits of the agreement but also obtain a large financial windfall. It is true that the president
of Company, who is also one of the partners of Attorney, testified that, regardless of the outcome of the case, it was the
intention of Company to pay the subscribers an amount
equivalent to that which the subscribers would have received
under the void agreement, minus costs of litigation, but a
court cannot be justified in rendering a decision which compels a litigant to rely on the magnanimity of his opponent
to obtain equity, unless such a result is unavoidable. I am
1
Section 1101 of the insurance Code provides: ''An admitted insurer's
officers, directors, trustees and any persons who have authority in the
management of the insurer's funds, shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this code: .. _ (c) Directly or indirectly purchase, or be interestr.d
in the purchase of, any of the assets of the insurer."
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satisfied that a proper application of the law to the facts
before us not only
but requires a more equitable result.
There are three matters in controversy, namely, the profits
realized by Company from the issuance of new insurance
fJV"'-'""'' to former subscribers of Exchange, the sum referred
to as attorney-in-fact fees, and the amount constituting the
surplus fund. Although I share the view of the rnathat there is snfiieient evidC'nce to support the trial
court's finding that the business profits were not obtained as a
consequence of the void 'rransfer and Assumption Agreement,
I cannot agree as to the disposition of the other two items. The
facts relating to them are undisputed, and only questions of
law are presented. The conclusion of the majority, in my opinion, results from an erroneous apfllication of the Underwriters
Agreement to the illegal transac>tion under consideration.
There can be no doubt that, mHlcr the Underwriters Agreement, any right of Attorney to attorney-in-fact fees must
arise from performance of the manageria 1 functions connected
with the business of Exchange. Undeniably, Attorney did not
perform such functions between January 1, 1949. when the
Transfer and Assumption Agreement was to take effect, and
November 6, 1953. when assets of Exchange were restored by
Company. 2 It is obvious. therefore. that Attorney would not
be entitled to fees allocable to that period.
Nor can Company have any right to attorney-in-fact fees.
Under the Underwriters Agreement, the fees were, of course,
intended as compensation for management services rendered to
Exchange, and, admittedly. Company did not at any time perform such services for Exchange but, inst0ad, performed them
solely for its own account, mistakenly believing that it was
the owner of Exchange's business. Any claim by Company
to the contractual amount of fees would necessarily depend
upon an effective assignment of Attorney's r1ghts. and there
was no such assignment. The purported assignment in January of 1949 was, by its terms, made because of the Transfer and
Assumption Agreement. 3 It was merely one step in the overall transaction by which Company illegally took over the busi2
The agreement for restoration of a8sets was executed on NovembeT
3, 1953, hut it was conditioned upon the Insurance Commissioner's issuance to Attorney of a Certificate of Authority. and such a eertificate was
issued on November 6, 19Ril.
'The purported assignment in 1949, after reciting that Attorney was
the Attorney-in-Fact for Exchange and was entitled to fees fo:r the performance of certain services, provided :
"WHEREAS, effective 12:01 A. M., January ], 1949, an of the assets
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and November 6, 1953, is
any services, Company
did not perform any services ''in accordance with the agreement," and no effective
was made. In my view,
it is
even if, as assumed by the majority
opinion, the Underwriters
continued in force, it
does not support the position taken but, to the contrary, compels the conclusion that the amount under consideration is
an asset of the subscribers.
The erroneous use of the Underwriters Agreement by the
majority in holding that the subscribers are not entitled to
the special surplus fund is
The agreement
''A
Surplus Fund shall be created to which
shall be set aside ali investment income; . . . it shall be used
for the benefit of the
as the Advisory Committee
and
discontinues busifor liabilities to the
of the Insurance Commissioner, shall be paid to
the attorney to
the expense of. and as compensation
of the ExCHANGE were transferred to l;oM:PANY and CoMPANY assumed
all of the obligations of
ExcHANGE including the obligation to perform eertain
for which performance the ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
to the ExcHANGE: and

with the ExCHANGE, the ATTORNEYcertain
in addition to

by it on or prior to the

of business on

agreed to perform the services retransferred and assigned its rights

because of a sale of assets in violation of
was
to
persons such as the
the detrimental action of those in a
torney.
done
its illegal
of the business may be
as constituting
since the law of the case, as decided on the prior
is that the void transfer
under which Company acted was not an
for the liquidation of Exbut one for
of assets and assumption of liabilities. (Industrial Indent Co. v. Golden State Co.,
117 CaLApp.2d
528
P.2d
.) While it appears
to be true
because of the unlawful transaction, the business cannot now be revived and must be liquidated, this cannot reasonably be treated as
rise to any right in
The
on March 31,
1954, amounted to $592,322.31, was, of course, intended to
relate to full and
To hold that Attorney
is entitled to the fund for
the remnants of a busidestruction it participated represents
an absurd
of the Underwriters Agreement. In
addition, such a holding would ignore the rule that one may
not take
of his
since the statutory
violation for which
are responsible
constitutes a wrong,
faith.
In view of the
taken
the
it is not
necessary in this dissent to consider whether, notwithstanding
the
of the action of
and Attorney, some
allowance should be
favor for the actual cost
that a proper
fees and the
surplus fund would
increase the recovery
of the subscribers. For
it appears to be undisputed
even if an allowance for actual costs were made, a re-
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fusal to grant Company
fees would alone
entitle the subscribers to
$324.000 more than
the amount awarded in the erroneous JUdgment affirmed by
the majority.
I would reverse the judgment.
Traynor,

concurred.

CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent.
'rhe reasoning and the conclusion reached by the majority
and concurring opinions are shocking to both my sense of justice aud my legal concepts. If I am not mistaken this case
will be appropriately classified in the annals of jurisprudence
with other ''crimes in ink.'' It is obvious to my mind and
I think it should be to any unbiased person that if this court
should apply the law of the case to the undisputed factual
background as disclosed by the record the inevitable result
would be a reversal of the judgment of the trial court with directions to retry the case in accordance with the law of the case
as declared in the first decision of this caoo by the District
Court of Appeal rendered on April 30th, 1953 (see Industrial
lndem. Co. v. Golden State Co., 117 Cal.App.2d 519 [256 P.2d
677]). Simply stated, the undisputed factual situation appears to be: Plaintiff Industrial Indemnity Company, through
its officers, and by means of their financial interests, controlled
both Industrial Indemnity Exchange (hereinafter referred to
as Exchange) and the Industrial Underwriters (hereinafter
referred to as Attorney-in-Fact). Prior to January 1st, 1949,
Exchange was the largest writer of workmen's compensation
insurance in California. It was a reciprocal insurance organization of which defendants Golden State Company, Ltd.,
G. W. Thomas Draying & Rigging Company, Inc., W. R.
Ballinger & Son, Minna M. Ballinger, Johnson Corporation,
et al. were subscribers. Exehange was then in competition
with plaintiff Industrial Indemnity Company in writing
policies of workmen's compensation insurance.
On December 21st, 1948, Industrial Indemnity Company,
Industrial Indemnity Exchange, acting through its Attorneyin-Fact and Advisory Committee, and Industrial Underwriters
entered into a Transfer and Assumption Agreement which
provided in part:
''That in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained the parties hereto do hereby agree as follows:
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I. REINSURANCE
"A. Effective as
1, 1949, Exdoes
cede and
does hereby completely
reinsure all
of insurance issued by the Exchange and
effect as of said time and date.
The
agrees to carry out and
all of
.~:CJ2aliJtaiJLge under the terms of said poliinsurance or any of
and to be
liable
thereon to the
of the
The Company
also undertakes to declare and pay policyholders' dividends in
to policies of insurance issued by the Exchange accordto the terms of such policies on the basis of the Exchange
dividend policy theretofore in effect.

'II. TRANSFER OF AssETS
"A. Effective 12:01 A.M., January 1, 1949, Exchange will
sell, assign and transfer and it does hereby sell, assign and
transfer to Company aU of the assets of the Exchange of whatever nature and kind, whether now known or hereafter discovered, owned by it at said ti.rne and date, and whether or not
appear·1:ng on its books as of said time and date.
"III. AssuMPTION OF LIABILITIES AND PAYMENTS TO BE
MADE

"A. Company agrees to accept and does hereby accept the
assignment and transfer of such assets as of the time and date
herein provided, and agrees to perform the acts hereinafter
set forth, and to pay the amounts computed as hereinafter
provided at the times and in the manner hereinafter more
particularly set forth.
''B. In addition to the obligations assumed under paragraph I hereof, Company agrees to assume and discharge and
does hereby assume any and all other liabilities of the Exchange of whatever nature or kind in any manner incurred
prior to 12 :01 A.M., January 1, 1949.
"C. Arnounts to be paid: As compensation for the assignment and transfer to it of the assets of the Exchange, Company will pay to the persons and in the manner herein set
forth an amount equal to the 'adjusted net worth' of the
Exchange, computed as follow;;:
"1. UNAD.JUSTED NET 'NORTH:
"An and it of the books of Industrial Indemnity Exchange
as of the close of business December 31, 1948, will be caused
to be made by the Company and the Advisory Committee
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as soon after December
as
event,
to the end of the month of
audit shall be conducted on the same basis as audits of the
Exchange have been made in re·~ent years, except that the
reserve for losses and claims shall be
upon the case
combasis rather than the 'Schedule P' formula basis.
of the
an audited balance sheet as of Decemwill be
the I11surance
to each member of the
Committee of the Exchange.
J:;,or purposes of such financial statement. the assets shall be
valued at market value as of December
1948. A copy of
such financial statement will thereupon be attached to this
agreement, marked 'Exhibit A.' and except for possible errors
in computation and possible omissions all the parties hereto
agree to be and are hereby bound by said financial statement.
"The unadjusted net worth of the Exchange as of the close
of business on December 31, 1948. shall be the sum of the
excess of statutory reserves for losses over case basis reserves
for such losses, the reserve for contingencies. special surplus
and unassigned surplus as shown on said financial statement. . . .

"IV. TIME AND AMOUNT OF PAYMENTS
"The total net payments, equal to the adjusted net worth,
to be made by the Company to the subscribers of the Exchange will be made by the Company at the following times:
''A. $1,000,000.00 on or before March 31, 1949;
"B. $500,000.00 on or before March 31, 1950;
"C. Any balance remaining due, on or before March 31,
1952.
''By mutual agreement between the Company and the Advisory Committee, and conditioned upon the prior approval
of the Insurance Commissioner, the dates for and amounts
of any of the foregoing payments may be postponed or
changed, as may be justified by future developments. . ..
"VII. WAIVER BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT oF RIGHTS IN SPECIAL
SURPLUS:

"In consideration of the covenants and agreements of the
other parties hereto as herein contained, the Attorney-in-Fact
hereby waives any and all rights which it may have in and
to the special surplus of the Exchange, and will not at any
time hereafter assert any rights whatever in or to said special
surplus.•••
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FuND
'"I' he
agrees to pay to the individual subscribers
entitled thereto the total amomct of the subscribers' individual
fund
paid or maintained as of December 31,
each of said
such payment to be made
each individual subscriber entitled thereto on or vvithin a
reasonable time after the termination of his policy.
the event that at such time there shall be due and
from such subscriber any
arising under a policy
the
on or before December 31, 1948, such
issued
subscriber's individual surplus fund deposit shall, to the
extent of any such premium due and unpaid, be credited or
applied in payment thereof." (Emphasis added.)
At the time this agreement was executed K. K. Bechtel
was president of Industrial Indemnity Company. He was
also managing partner of Industrial Underwriters, Attorneyin-Fact for Industrial Indemnity Exchange. While Mr.
Bechtel did not sign the contract on behalf of Industrial Indemnity Company, he signed it as managing partner of Industrial Underwriters, Attorney-in-Fact for Industrial Indemnity Exchange and as a member of the Advisory Committee of Industrial Indemnity Exchange and as managing
partner of Industrial Underwriters. The contract was executed on behalf of Industrial Indemnity Company by Thomas
G. McGuire, Executive Vice-President. It was found by the
trial court and conceded by all of the parties to this litigation
that Mr. Bechtel and his associates in Industrial Indemnity
Company, by virtue of their financial interests, controlled all
of the parties to said agreement. In this respect the District
Court of Appeal in its first decision of this case cited supra
stated: "Neither is it denied nor could it be denied that the
members of the Attorney are persons who have authority in
the management of the funds of the Exchange. The interrelation between the Attorney and the Company, which is at the
basis of this whole case, leaves no doubt that said partners in
the Attorney would be interested in, at least indirectly, any
purchase made by the Company. In this respect it will suffice
to quote from finding 16 of the court the following passus
which is not attacked:
" 'The stock ownership of Industrial Indemnity Company
has at all times been substantially the same as the ownership
of Industrial Underwriters, a partnership, the attorney-in-
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528
fact of the "'""'-'.U<"'"
P.2d
Prior to the execution of said
an attempt had
Mr. Bechtel and his associates to procure the
been made
consent of all of the subscribers of the
to said
Transfer and
and they succeeded in
98 per cent of said
then commenced
and
of San
Francisco
subscribers of Industrial
Agreement. 'l'he nonconsenting subscribers cross-complained
in said action, claiming that ali the insurance business transacted by Industrial Indemnity Company belonged in equity to
Exchange, from whose buRiness it was alleged to have been
disloyally diverted by Industria! Underwriters, the Attorneyin-Fact of said Exchange, whose partners substantially owned
the stock of Industrial Indemnity Company.
The trial court awarded plaintiff Industrial Indemnity
Company the relief demanded by it in said action and denied
any relief to the objecting subscribers.
The subscribers appealed and the District Court of Appeal
in its decision cited supra, reversed the judgment and decree
of the trial court and laid down the following rules which
constitute the law of the ease and should have controlled the
subsequent disposition of the case:
(1) The District Court of Appeal specifically held that
the Transfer and Assumption Agreement constituted a sale of
all of the assets and business of Exchange to Company. In
this respect the court stated at page 530: "Respondents urge,
however, that even if it were an actual sale, as we consider it,
the agreement would come under an exception to section 1101
[of the Insurance Code] . . . . " (Emphasis added.)
(2) The District Court of Appeal specifically held that Exchange was not in liquidation. In response to the contention
of Company that the Transfer and Assumption Agreement
was actually an agreement to liquidate, the court stated at
pages 528 and 529: Company contends that "the transaction
was actually an agreement to liquidate. However that is not
the case. . . . Another circumstance which shows that the
Company did not act merely as liquidator is of greater importance from a practical point of view. By taking over all
assets, assuming all liabilities, including all outstanding
policies of the Exchange and becoming directly liable thereon
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to the policyholders, the Company acquired the whole business of the Exchange as a going concern and would therefore
benefit
the increase of its clientele."
In answer to Company's contention that the Insurance Commissioner could require the sale of Exchange to
Company (section 1
the District Court of Appeal specifiheld at page 530: "'I' he contention is without merit.
The Commissioner did not
and had no power to require
the sale of the whole business of the Exchange as a going
concern. To 'require' in this sense means 'to demand ; to
claim as by right and authority: to exact.' (Webster.) The
Commissioner did not demand it and had no authority to demand it.''
( 4) The District Court of Appeal held that the Transfer
and Assumption Agreement was illegal and void because in
contravention of section 1101 of the Insurance Code, which
provides that an admitted insurer's officers, directors, trustees
or any persons having authority to manage the insurer's funds
shall not ''directly or indirectly purchase, or be interested in
the purchase of, any of the assets of the insurer." It further
held that section 1106 makes any violation of section 1101 a
misdemeanor. In this respect the court stated at page 527:
"We have concluded that the original action fbrought by
Company] for declaratory relief should have been denied because the agreement to which it relates is void as violating
section 1101 of the [nsurance Code. expressly made applicable
to reciprocal exchanges by section 1282 of said code."
(5) With respect to the contentions made by Company that
it acted in "good faith" because it did not know the law forbade the transaction and made such a violation of the law
a crime, the court stated at page 532: ''Even if their said
conduct was in good faith and proper, as found by the court
below, it would create a precedent wholly adverse to the purpose of section 1101, subdivision (c). if they were permitted
to solve the difficulties so caused by absorbing the going business of the Exchange into their privately owned corporation.
even if the price they paid for it would be adequate."
(6) The District Court of Appeal specifically held that the
officers of plaintiff and the other parties to the Agreement
were acting in a fiduciary capacity and could not seize for
themselves the assets of Exchange as contemplated by the
'rransfer and Assumption Agreement. At page 533 the court
said: "Since the leading case of Gnth v. Loft, 23 Del.Ch. 255
[ 5 A.2d 503], it has been generally accepted that a corporate
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officer or director may not seize for himself to the detriment
of his company business
in the
line
of activities which the company has an interest and prior
claim to obtain, and that if he seizes them in violation of his
fiduciary
the
may claim for itself all benefits
so obtained
him. 'l'he doctrine was
venturers in Macisaac v.
81
P.2d
, and is
applicable in all situations in which
a person manages or transacts business for another or for
others to whom he stands in a fiduciary relation without being
trustee of an express trust. The position of the attorney-infact of a reciprocal insurance exchange, who manages the
business of the exchange under powers of attorney of the subscribers, who provide the means for the reciprocal insurance
enterprise, is fiduciary in character to the same extent as that
of the management of an incorporated mutual insurance company, although neither is a real trustee. (See Caminetti v.
State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 52 Cal.App.2d 321, 323 P26 P.2d
165]) and the doctrine of corporate opportunities is equally
applicable.''
With respect to the language of the court concerning the
evidence as supporting the findings of fact of the trial court
that Company had not breached its fiduciary duty toward
Exchange, it is obvious that it was referring to the contention
of Exchange that it was entitled to the whole business of Company because it said at page 539: ''Under these circumstances
it is not for us to say that the ultimate findings of the court
below are necessarily improper inferences nor can we hold as
a matter of law, contrary to said findings, that the Attorney
breached its fiduciary duty to subscribers when it engaged
in the writing of workmen's compensation insttrance through
the medium of Company or that the bnsiness of Company
was in equity the property of Exchange. We are the more
satisfied that this result is not unjust because the gain by
Exchange of all profits of the business of Company without
partic1:pation in them by any of Company's insureds would
have given the subscribers of tlw Exchange a windfall wholly
out of line with the setup of such Exchange." (Emphasis
added.)
The findings of the tria] court that Company had not
breached its fiduciary duties toward Exchange were, therefore, held by the District Court of Appeal to relate to Company's participating in the workmen's compensation insurance field before the
take-over of Exchange ; and to
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to such take-over. It is obvious that
this discussion on the part of the District Court of Appeal
does not relate to
breach of its fiduciary duty to
in
the Transfer and Assumption Agreement, which it had theretofore held to be an invalid, illegal
and void agreement of
and sale.
'l'he conclusions reached in the District Court of Appeal
were as follows: 1. ''Although we hold that the subscribers of Exchange are not entitled to the business built
np
in
then
are necessarily
not entitled either to the business of its wholly owned subIndustrial Service Company, mentioned separately
on appeal-they have a right to the business taken over by
Company in consequence of the transfer and assumption
agreement, which we have held to be invalid. If they so desire
they are entitled to have that matter wound up in these equity
proceedings and for that purpose the judgment denying all
relief on the cross-complaints [by Exchange] will also have
to be reversed." (Emphasis added.)
2. The trial court was directed to "deny all declaratory
relief to plaintiffs [Company] on the ground that the agreement as to which it is prayed for is void as contrary to
law . . . . "
3. The trial court was directed to grant such relief to Exchange as to permit them to recover in ''their representative
capacity for subscribers the business and assets obtained by
Company in consequence of the agreement herein held to be
i.nvalid. . . . " (Emphasis added.)
The gist of the decision of the District Court of Appeal cited
supra which is now the law of the case, may be summarized
as follows: The Transfer and Assumption Agreement dated
December 21st, 1948, constituted an attempted sale of all of
the business and assets of Exchange to Industrial Indemnity
Company. Such a sale was illegal in face of the objection of
the nonconsenting subscribers to Exchange. The illegality of
such sale and transfer was based both upon common law
rules and statutory law of this state. It violated common law
rules because the officers of the participating companies were
acting in a fiduciary capacity to the subscribers of Exchange.
Those officers violated their fiduciary duty under the common
law by appropriating to their own use the property of the
subscribers of Exchange without their consent. The legal
effect of this transaction was that the directors and officers of
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because of their financial '"'+""""'"'t"
Exchange, Industrial Underwriters and Attorney-in-Fact,
used their power of control to deprive subscribers of Exchange
of their property rights in
in violation of their
:fiduciary duty to subscribers which no court of justice should
sanction. The transaction was in violation of the statutory
law of this state because
and specifically prohibited
by section 1101 of the Insurance
the violation of which
section was made a misdemeanor
section 1106 of the Insurance Code. Because the entire transaction was illegal for the
reasons above stated and the participants therein were guilty
of a crime under the law of this state, Industrial Indemnity
Company had no standing in a court of justice to enforce the
Agreement and its action brought for this purpose was ordered dismissed. The court, however, reserved to the nonconsenting subscribers the right to resort to the court for the
protection of their rights which should contemplate the
restoration by Company to the Exchange of the business and
assets illegally appropriated or an award of compensation
adequate to cover the value of such business and assets so
illegally appropriated together with all accrued increments
therefrom.
It is obvious that the trial court on the retrial of the case
utterly disregarded the law of the case as declared by the first
opinion of the District Court of Appeal cited supra. In direct
violation of the law of the case announced in said decision the
trial court held and found that Industrial Indemnity Company took over the business and assets of Exchange for the
purpose of liquidation and that Exchange was not entitled to
the going concern value of its business at the time of the
illegal transaction. It charged Exchange with the cost and
expenses incurred by Company in winding up the business of
Exchange and awarded to Company assets of Exchange worth
considerably over a million dollars without awarding subscribers of Exchange any compensation therefor.
The obviously palpable result and legal effect of the decision of the trial court on the retrial of this case was to deprive
the subscribers of Exchange of their property which consisted
of a valuable beneficial interest in the business of Exchange
without due process of law. A clear and concise statement
with respect to the protection of the right of private property
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States was made by Mr. ,Justice Day of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
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at page 74
. Speaking for a
Constituunanimous court he there declared : ''The
tion and laws
within its authority are by the express
terms of that instrument made the supreme law of the land.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects life, liberty, and propfrom invasion
the States without due process of law.
Pr,r;n.<>l't·.v is more than the mere thing which a person owns.
It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and
of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391
S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780]. Property consists of the free
use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1
Blackstone's Commentaries (Cooley's Ed.), 127." In Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 [50 S.Ct. 451, 74 L.Ed.
1107], the Supreme Court of the United States specifically
held that judicial action as state action is within the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At pages 681
and 682 the court stated: ''But, while it is for the state courts
to determine the adjective as well as the substantive law of
the State, they must, in so doing, accord the parties due process
of law. Whether acting through its judiciary or through its
legislature, a State may not deprive a person of all existing
remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the State
has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to
him some real opportunity to protect it. Compare Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. N ewpo·rt, 247 U.S. 464, 475-6 [38 S.Ct.
566, 62 L.Ed. 1215]." (Emphasis added.)
We have here a situation where the beneficial intereststhe property rights of Exchange and subscribers in the business and assets of Exchange are taken from them by Company without their consent and in violation of both common
law rules and statutory law, and Company and its officers
committed a crime under the law of this state when it and
they appropriated the property of Exchange and subscribers
to the use of Company by means of the illegal and void Transfer and Assumption Agreement. Under every concept of law,
equity, justice or fair dealing, Exchange and subscribers are
entitled to have their property or its full value restored to
them with all accrued increments. But under the majority
decision in this case, property, admittedly worth approximately two million dollars at the time it was illegally appropriated by Company, with all its accrued increments of
411 C.M-141

under any
entitled to the """'n""'r
fair-minded men.
have
believed that the
of the due process clauses
both our state and
federal Constitutions
a fair and honest
tion of the settled rules of law to
established
situation.
by this process may
The
result reached by the
here
every
of due process of law with
I am familiar.
The majority glosses over the damning fact that in seizing
the business and assets of Exchange in the manner shown by
the record here, Company and itR officers committed a crime-a misdemeanor (see Ins. Code, §§ 1101, 1106) - and since
overt acts were committed in the furtherance of an unlawful
agreement, the crime amounted to a felony under the law of
this state (Pen. Code, § 182; Calhoun v. S1tperior Court, 46
Cal.2d 18 [291 P.2d 474] ; People v. JJialotte, 46 Cal.2d 59
[292 P.2d 517] ; Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49
[216 P.2d 859] ; People v. Robinson, 43 Cal.2d 132 [271 P.2d
865]; People v. Vanderpool, 20 Cal.2d 746 [128 P.2d 513]).
The illegal and void Transfer and Assumption Agreement
itself makes out a clear case of conspiracy to violate sections
1101 and 1106 of the Insurance Code by the participants in
this illegal transaction. Of course, no prosecution was instituted against them. This is just another exampl~ of the
unequal administration of our criminal law. There can be
no doubt that the power and influence of the participants
in this illegal transaction weighed heavily in the iletermination of the prosecuting officials not to proceed against them
under the above cited authorities. We also find two justices
of this court (see concurring
of .Justices Schauer and
Shenk) expressing their approval and commendation of the
unlawful conduct of these participants in the consummation
of this illegal transaction. This demonstrates the truth of the
charge made by some critics of our judicial system that those
with sufficient wealth, power and influence can evade the law
and that the phrase "equal justice under law'' is empty and
meaningless in such situations. It is obvious that on the
record before us justice has been outraged by the result
reached by the majority and those who believe in the ideal
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' as well as the victims of this
In my considered
it may be found
in the inferences which may be
dravm from the time honored
expression that
·'You can't convict a million dollars.''
The essential facts of the
here are
very
and
up of the same momone and the same person
with a
of the membership
Exchange
for the
of the assets of Exchange some of whose
members refused to consent to the purchase and sale. The
price was $1,018,539.07. After a series of legal
maneuvers
be discussed hereinafter), instigated by Company, Exchange subscribers, the innocent victims of the swindle, are held legally entitled to only the sum of $323,300.39.
Company brought the original action for declaratory relief
regarding the rights of subscribers of Exchange. The original
action culminated in an estimated award to Exchange of
$1,895,347.07. Exchange appealed. The District Court of
Appeal reversed on the ground that the Agreement was illegal,
void and of no effect, and directed that an accounting be had
to determine the value of the "whole going business" of Exchange which had been, by means of the Agreement, illegally
taken over by Company. Company, believing it had lost in
the District Court of Appeal, petitioned this court for a hearWe denied a hearing. The opinion of the District Court
of Appeal (117 Cal.App.2d 519 [256 P.2d 677]) thereby
became the law of the case on a retrial of the action.
On retrial Exchange recovered $323,300.89 as the value of
their "whole going business" which had been illegally taken
over by Company as compared with the sum of $1,895,347.07
recovered by it at the first trial from which judgment Exchange had appealed and won a reversaL The judgment rendered on the second trial was appealed by Exchange and
determined by the same District Court of Appeal which had
heard the first appeal. On the second appeal ( (Cal.App.) 301
P.2d 112) the judgment was
reversed with the District
Court of Appeal holding that the decision theretofore rendered by it had not been followed by the trial court and stating, among other things, that because of the judgment on
retrial "the Company will have in fact everything, for which
it agreed in the invalid
to pay considerably more
than one million dollars to the subscribers and will pay for it
$323,300.39.,.
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At the time of the second trial the evidence showed indisputably that Company had collected over 20 million dollars
in gross premiums because of the increased business it had
obtained through the illegal take-over of Exchange. 'l'he net
profit was not ascertained. The District Court of Appeal
specifically held, on the first
that by means of the
illegal agreement Company increased its clientele. It was
there held that by its illegal
"the Company acquired the whole business of Exchange as a going concern and
would therefore benefit by the increase of its clientele.'' Consents to the illegal agreement were obtained by sending out,
in addition to 80 or 90 solicitors of consents, a letter which
read, in part: "At normal expiration of your policy, in
1949 you will be offered a participating policy in Industrial
Indemnity Company, a stock company.... Your policy with
Industrial Indemnity Company will be serviced by the same
personnel, located at the same offices as in the past." The
District Court of Appeal (117 Cal.App.2d 519 [256 P.2d
677]) commented on Company's tactics as follows: ''That in
this manner the Company received an advantage not consistent with the position of a mere liquidator seems obvious."
By the holding of the majority here, Company profits by
its illegal conduct in that it is permitted to:
1. Retain all the net profits directly traceable to former
Exchange subscribers although the loss experience was deducted from Exchange's recovery;
2. Retain the special surplus fund of $592,322.31 and the
increment thereof to which it was not entitled since Exchange
was not in liquidation but had been illegally put out of
business by Company and since the original underwriters'
agreements were no longer in existence ;
3. Retain the Attorney-in-Fact fees which amounted, at the
time of trial, to $324,751.07 to which it was not entitled since
the original underwriters' agreements were no longer in existence but were superseded by the illegal agreement.
In the majority opinion the issue as to net profits is discussed and the discussion relative thereto consists of quoting
thirteen findings of fact and then making the bald, unadorned
statement that" It logically follows that since the trial court's
findings were supported by evidence and covered the issue
that the appellate court had ordered to be retried, the judgment in the principal amount should be affirmed."
A slight attempt is made in the majority opinion to show
that these findings are supported by the evidence in that
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to the effect that since the pv.u"·'""'
were renewed
there was no assurance that Exchange
would have had any future subscribers had it not been illegally
out of business. Inasmuch as the record, as the majority
shows that
had been the
company of
its kind for a
to being illegally
behind the matinned in business in any event is
no attempt is made in the majority opinion to
made
the trial court with the law
reconcile the
of the ease as set forth by the District Court of Appeal in its
first opinion
CaLApp.2d 519 [256 P.2d 677]). Isolated
bits of testimony extracted from the enormous record before
us in support of erroneous findings do not concern us, or should
not concern us, when there is a question of law involved.
We are not concer·necl with whether or not the evidence supports these erroneous findings and conclnsions since it is
obvio1ts that the trial court was not following the law of the
case as laid down by the decision of the District Court of
Appeal, supra. The very fact that the trial court considered
Exchange to be in liquidation shows the error, since liquidation is the antithesis of a going business concern. It is also
obvious that the judgment permitting Company to obtain all
assets of Exchange for a lesser figure than that provided for
in the void Agreement is in contravention of the holding of
the District Court of Appeal that Company and Attorney
stood in a fiduciary relationship so far as Exchange was
concerned and that a fiduciary may not benefit by a breach
of its duties to its beneficiary. The District Court of Appeal
specifically held in its first opinion (117 Cal.App.2d 519 [256
P.2d 677]) that the doctrine of corporate opportunities was
applicable; that if a corporate officer or director seized for
himself such opportunities "in violation of his fiduciary duty
the corporation may claim for itself all benefits so obtained by
him" (emphasis added) 117 Cal.App.2d at p. 533) and that
the purchase of Exchange constituted the breach of CompanyAttorney's fiduciary duty to Exchange subscribers. This
court held in Estate o.f Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 258 [223 P. 974].
while discussing the law of the case as decided in a former
appeal in the same case, that "It was no part of the trial
court's function to determine '.vhether the former appeal had
been correctly decided; its sole duty was to follow without
question the principles established by that decision. This
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the trial court failed
erroneous within the meandemned are therefore
ing of the constitution
art. VI)." We also held
(Central Sav. Bank
Oakland v.
201 Cal. 438, 44:1
[257 P. 521]) that "It has
been the law of this state
that an unqualified reversal remands the cause for a new trial
(Falkner v.
107 Cal.
54
P.
) , and
the
in the trial court in the same
with the "'~''""''~u.,
the cmtrt on
as applicable
177
(Sharp v.
Cal. 367
P. 846])." (Emphasis added.) (See also
Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452, 457 [132 P.2d 471]; Chamberlain Co. v. Allis-Chalrners Mfg. Co., 74 Cal.App.2d 941, 943
[170 P.2d 85]; Steeldnct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer Co., 26 Cal.2d
634,643 [160 P.2d 804]; Wallace v. Sisson, 114 Cal. 42,43 [45
P. 1000]; Por·ter v. Muller, 112 Cal. 355, 366 [44 P. 729]:
Clark v. Deschamps, 109 Cal.App.2d 765 [241 P.2d 681] .)
We are not here concerned with the method by which Exchange's recovery should be determined since that is a matter
to be determined on a retrial upon evidence given by experts
in the insurance actuarial field. We are concerned here with
what items should be considered a part of the subscribers'
recovery.
Future Profits
In order to demonstrate conclusively that the findings do not
follow the law of the case as set forth by the District Court
of Appeal, I will summarize that court's holdings and compare
them with the trial court's findings:
1. The District Court held that the Transfer and Assumption Agreement constituted a purchase by Company of Exchange and that such Agreement was illegal and void. It was
specifically held that Exchange was not in liquidation.
Finding IV recites that Underwriters hold the property and
assets of Exchange ''for distribution to the subscribers of the
Exchange in liquidation of its business and affairs . ... "
Company contended on the first appeal that the Agreement
"was actually an agreement to liquidate." The District Court
of Appeal said: "However, that is not the case.... Another
circumstance which shows that the Company did not act
merely as liquidator is of greater importance from a practical
point of view. By taking over all assets, assuming all liabilities, including all outstanding policies of the Exchange
and becoming directly liable thereon to the policyholders, the
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and
the effect that under the
"no
n.:>.eu;ttu 1,;e with respect to the
uvuc.te:s taken over thereof the
the
under; that because of the
That loss
loss thereon must be charged up to
amounted to
Finding V recites that no policies written after December
1948, for or on behalf of any former subscribers of Exform any part of the net worth of Exchange.
These findings are in direct conflict with the express holding
of the District Court of Appeal that Company illegally and
unlawfully took over the" whole going business of Exchange."
Findings XIII and XIV are to the effect that policies of
insurance were placed voluntarily with either Exchange or
Company on a year to year basis and that all policies placed
with Company after December 31, 1948, on behalf of persons
who had formerly been policyholders of Exchange were voluntarily placed with Company as new items of business by
insurance agents who were free to place sueh policies with such
insurance carrier as they chose. Finding XIV concluded that
no policy was placed with Company "by reason of or as a consequence of activities of Company being performed under, or
arising as a consequence of, the Transfer and Assumption
Agreement or because Company was regarded in any sense as
being the successor of Exchange.''

The District Cot~rt of Appeal held firmly amd unequivocally
that due to Company's conduct in sending solicitors out and
in mailing a letter to all Exchange subscribers it obtained an
increase in iis clientele to which it would not otherwise have
been entitled.
Finding XVIII recites that Company did not use or receive
any information from Exchange as a consequence of the illegal
agreement.
Company had the information due to the interlocking relationship between it and Attorney and it was due to that
information that it was able to contact all Exchange subscribers and obtain their bu;;iness on the theory that the
business placed with it would be serviced with the same personnel and from the same offices as it had been when lli:l!::cw:ln~~e
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was a going business concern. Furthermore, the solicitation
and letters were both accomplished while Exchange was still
a going concern.
Finding XXXI recites in effect that it is not true that
Exchange was entitled to any future profits.
This of course directly belies the mandate of the District
Court of Appeal that Company illegally took over the whole
going business of Exchange ; that an accounting should be
had to determine the value thereof; that Company increased
its clientele through its illegal tactics. The evidence also
showed indisputably that Company had collected over 20
million dollars in gross premiums due to the increased business it had obtained because of the illegal take-over of Exchange.
The only effort made in the majority opinion to comply
with the law of the case is to set forth the findings on the
retrial and state without amplification that they are within
the issue ordered to be retried and that they are supported
by the evidence.
The District Court of Appeal (117 Cal.App.2d 519 [256
P.2d 677]) did not hold that Exchange was not entitled to
the profits accruing by reason of the illegal take-over of its
business by Company. It did hold that Exchange subscribers
were not entitled to the profits made from both Exchange
and Company business. The court had this to say (p. 539):
"Under these circumstances it is not for us to say that the
ultimate findings of the court below are necessarily improper
inferences nor can we hold as a matter of law, contrary to
said findings, that the Attorney breached its fiduciary duty to
subscribers when it engaged in the writing of workmen's compensation insurance through the medittm of Company or that
the business of Company was in equity the property of Exchange. We are the more satisfied that this res?tlt is not un.fust
becattse the gain by Exchange of all the profits of the business
of Company without participation in them by any of Company's insureds would have given the subscribers of the Exchange a windfall wholly out of line with the setup of such
Exchange." (Emphasis added.) The emphasized portion
shows clearly that the District Court was referring to the
business of Company as distinguished from the profits made
by Company from the bnsiness taken away from Exchange
sttbscribers since the statement was in answer to a contention
made by Exchange that it was entitled to all of Company's
business in the compensation insurance field before the unlaw-
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of the evidence said to be
it is immaterial in
event Rince the
are
not in accord with the law of the case. The very fact that
indisputably,
"'"'w-''w" was in
shows the
error since
is the antithesis of a going business
concern. It is also obvious that the
permitting
Company to obtain all assets of
for a lower figure
than that
for in the void Agreement is in contrauv1.uu'~ of the District Court of Appeal that
stood in
relationship so far
as Exchange was concerned and that a fiduciary may not
benefit by a breach of its duties to its beneficiary.
So far as business profits are
the law is that
where there has been a breach of a
duty, a constructive trust is imposed upon a person in order to prevent his
unjust enrichment. In most cases where a constructive trust
is imposed, the result is to restore to the injured person
property of which he has been
deprived and to take
from the wrongdoer property, the retention of which by him,
would result in a corresponding unjust enrichment of the
wrongdoer. (/{oyer v. Willmon, 150 Cal. 785 [90 P. 135];
Broder v. Conklin, 121 Cal. 282 [53 p. 699] ; Johnson V. mark,
7 Cal.2d 529
P.2d 767] ; Forman v. Goldberg, 42 Cal.App.
2d 308 [108 P.2d
Restitution, §§ 160, 190.) It
follows logically from the
that before Exchange may
be made whole for what has been illegally taken from it by
Company, the latter must be forced to return to Exchange
that which was taken
with the
made therefrom.
Exchange intri:>duced evidence showing that it was possible
to trace former Exchange business for the five-year period
subsequent to the execution of the illegal Agreement. The
majority would have us assume that had the illegal Agreement
not been executed all of
subscribers would have
ceased being Exchange subscribers and placed their business
<>uJcwc,eu.c,

with
is neither
nor
able;
had been a prosperous
concern for many
yean; prior to the execution of the
and would, in
all probability, have eontinued as one. 'fhe majority holding
that Exchange subseribers are entitled to no reimbursement
from Company after the
of the last yearly policy
issued
which
the law has

to

from his own wrong.

Company-Attorney stood in a
rt>lation to Exchange
CaL,\pp.2d 5J9
P.2d 677]) and should therefore
be held to the same standards as the law imposes on the
trustee of an express trust (117 Cal.App.2d 519 f256 P.2d
677] ). (See also Clapp v. Vatcher, 9 CaLApp. 462. 466 [99
P. 549] ; Edgar v. Bank of America, 50 Ca!.App.2d 827, 833
[123 P.2d 885] ; 'l'he Fiduciary Principle, 37 C.L.R. 539-555.)
It is an elementary principle of tht> law of trusts that a trustee
is forbidden to make use of the trust property for his private
or individual purposes or to derive any profit therefrom (Civ.
Code, § 2229; Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 521, 529 [163 P.
893] ; Hest., Trusts, § 205 (b) ; Crenshaw v. Roy C. 8eeley Co.,
129 Cal.App. 627 [ 19 P.2d 50) ; 25 CaLJur., § 190, p. 342)
and if he does derive profit from such a breach of trust he is
liable to the beneficiary therefor (Estate of Piercy, 168 Cal.
755 [145 P. 91]; Burns v. Clark, 133 Cal. 634, 639 [66 P. 12,
85 Arn.St.Hep. 233] ; 1'obin Grocery Co. v. Spry, 204 CaL 247
[ 267 P. 694] ; 2 Scott on Trusts, § 170.2, p. 1199 ; Rest., Trusts,
§ 205 (b) ; Civ. Code, § 2237). The policy of the law has always
been, up until this case, to put fiduciaries beyond the reaeh
of temptation by making it unprofitable for them to yield to it.
(Maclsnac v. Pozzo, 81 Cal.App.2d 278, 285 [183 P.2d 910];
111·iller v. McKinnon, 20 Ca1.2d 83 [124 P.2d 34, 140 A.L.R.
570]; Hoyt v. Harnpe, 206 Iowa 206 [214 N.W. 718, 724] .)
The breach of the fiduciary duty in the case at bar has proved
very profitable to Company and a majority of this court has
placed its stamp of approval thereon.
The rule which sho1tld be applied here is that stated in the
Restatement of Restitution, section 160, Comment (d): "There
are some situations, however, in which a constructive trust is
imposed in favor of a plaintiff who has not suffered a loss
or who has not suffered a loss as great as the benefit received
by the defendant. In theile situations the defendant is compelled to surrender the benefit on the ground that he would be
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it, even
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that enrichment is not at the expense of the
if the defendant has made a
through the violation
to whom he is in a fiduciary relation,
to the
to surrender the profit to the plaintiff,
was not made at the expeme of the plaintiff."
eases from California* which are in
accord with the Restatement rule
set forth must, under
be deemed overruled. The
in totally
the
the law of the
ease, and the far-reaching effects its ill-advised decision will
have on one of California's major industries, does not even
discuss the law of restitution, and trusts, but holdB, simply
and without amplification, that the evidence supports the find! One would never know from reading the majority opinion that any law was involved; one would never know the
of the theft committed as the result of the unlawful
conduct of the officers of Company which is here judicially
sanctioned.
Speci<Jl Snrplus P·und
In order that the attorneys and the people of this state who
are interested in the purchase of insurance may understand
just exactly what took place in this ease, I will set forth the
facts relating to the second major issue involved here.
Tlw undisputed evidence in the record shows that under
the old undenvriters' agreements which were the original
agreements between Exchange and Attorney, the Special Surplus Fund was a fund set aside from premiums on policies
issued by Exchange and was intended to be used for the
expenses of liquidation in the event Exehange was ever liquidated by Attorney in accordance with the terms of thr original
agreements. There is no dispute that such liquidation has
never taken place or was even contemplated, as the undisputed
evidence shows that Company took over all assets of Exchange
as a going bnsiness and that the Special Surplus Fund was one
of the items which Company set up as an asset of Exchange for
which Company agreed to pay the subscribers of Exchange
the sum of $1,045,159.71. How the trial court determined that
"Burns v. Clark, 133 Cal. 634 [ 66 P. 12, 85 Am.St.Rop. 233] ; Tobin
Grocery Co. v. Spry, 204 Cal. 24'i [267 P. 694]; Weiner v. M1tllaney,
59 Cal.App.2d 620 [140 P.2d 704]; Edgar v. Bank of America, 102 Cal.
App.2d 700 [228 P.2ct 21]; Lantz v. StTibling, 130 Cal.App.2d 476 [279
P.2d 112]; and see also Crites, Inc. v. Prudential Co., 322 U.S. 408, 417
[64 S.Ct. 1075, 88 hEd. 1356]; MagTuder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 120
[35 S.Ct. 77, 59 L.Ed.
Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 588·589
[ 41 S.Ct. 200, 65 L.Ed.

0.2d

take-over

'r.•n~cmn is entitled
to this fund. 'l'he
relied on is marvelous example of
utter confusion. l"irst it is said: ''. . . the trial court found
that the
Fund was, under the Underwriters
for expenses incurred in conneeto
; that on Noto Company as compensaconnection with the
less such
as required to reimburse Attorney for future costs of
; and that the
subscribers have no
or claim to this
si.nee it was
not a part of
's business or assets." (Emphasis
added.)
quoted the
of the superseded
underwriters' agreements, the majority then states: "Under
the Underwriters
Attorney-in-Fact was entitled to
this fund 'if
discontinues business,' as compensation for
up the affairs and liquidation. The question
then arises whether
has been 'discontinued.' The
trial eourt found that it
and the evidence supports the
finding." It should be
horne in mind that this
Special
Fund was derived from investrn,ent income
of Exchange. It shcmk! also
remembered that the membership of
and
was identical. It should also
he remembered that the District Court of Appeal specifically
and unequivocally held that
was not in liquidation.
Under the
the
discontinuance of
business by
ma,chinations of Company must be
Relying on the
the

tMore of this later.

waived its
fund. When the facts are understood it becomes apparent
that
waiver of its rights to the fnnd is
the
his money from his right to his
do2s not make clear
ag·reement dedared
the District
Court of Appral to be void and of no t>ffect e~tn be relied on
in support of a
of the
eourt. The majority,
in an effort to
its holding, quo'es, out of context, a
statement made
the District Court of
in its opinion
on the :fir;:;t appeal (117
519, 537
P.2d 677])
that "The Company did not at an~· time in the operation of
its business use any
facilities or information belonging
or secured through, the
In
tlJe District
Court was
to the situation as it was
to the
take-over of Exchange when
engaged in
compensation insurance in
with Exchange.
The majority,
involved to Company,
goes along with
that it was entitled to
the Special Surplus Fund under the old underwriters' agreements which, it
were reinstated
the holding of
the District Court of
that the Transfer and Assumption Agreement was invalid and void. The underwriters'
agreements
that
should use the fund
in the event of the
discontinuance of business by
The result to be reached so far as the Special
Surplus Fund is concerned shonld be, since
was
illegally sold to
and since it is now too late to set
aside the illegal
that the subscribers of
should
be compensated as
as
for that which they have
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lost which includes this fund which constituted their investment
It stands to reason that had the illegal sale
not taken place, the
Surplus Fund would have remained intact.
agrees, although under the circumstances its
is a magnanimous one, that Company
should be reimbursed for its actual expenses in winding up
the affairs of
But aside from that agreement.
Exchange is most
entitled to the
Fund.
v. A_rt.el, 40
P.2d 380];
Nat. Bank & Trust
269
85 ILEd. 820]

Attorney-in-Fact Fees
This is another major issue involved which the majority
opinion glosses over, and again the facts relating thereto will
be set forth.
Prior to the execution of the Agreement and under the old
underwriters' agre.ernents Attorney was entitled to retain 25
per cent of the premium deposits and 5 per cent of dividends
as its fee. In consideration of this fee, Attorney was required
to pay for all offices, equipment and personnel used for the
business of Exchange. Subsequent to January 1, 1949, when
the illegal AgTeement became effective, Company admits that
it handled this business for its own account. The evidence
shows that Company had, at the time of retrial, collected
$78,419.13 as fees on dividends and the sum of $246,331.94
as fees on premiums on the business di.rectly traceable to former Exchange subscribers. Just how, or why, Exchange
should be charged with the fees provided for by the old underwriters' agreements after the effective date of the illegal Agreement remains a mystery. After the effective date of the illegal
Agreement by Company's own admission it was acting on its
own accmmt and there was no Attorney in existence. Ex~
change's recovery should be lessened only by the amount of the
actual costs incurred by Company in conducting the business
directly traceable to former Exchange subscribers. To hold
otherwise permits Company to profit by its own wrongdoing.
There can be no question but that the old underwriters'
agreements were superseded by the illegal Agreement; there
can also be no question but that the old underwriters' agreements were not revitalized by the District Court of Appeal's
holding that the Transfer and Assumption Agreement was
illegal, void and of no effect. Company by its conduct after
the assumption of Exchange business demonstrated that it
was not acting under the old underwriters' agreements. (See
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recwn;>u~·vmwtu

Water etc. Co. v. Consolidated Ga.~ etc. Co.
, 186 F.2d 934, and Virginia Dare Transp. Co. v.
Norfolk Southen1 Bus
4, 1949], 176 F.2d 354,
for cases holding that a judicial declaration of the invalidity
of a later contract does not revitalize an original valid contract.)
The
to the fees paid
are commented on as follows by the
''The evidence supporting the foregoing findings
the Underwriters Agreement; (b) the Transfer and
; and
the agreement whereby
Company assumed the obligations of Attorney and Attorney
assigned its rights to the management fees." This statement is
particularly interesting when it is remembered (1) that the
Underwriters' Agreement was superseded by the Transfer and
Assumption Agreement which was held to be illegal, void and
of no effect, and ( 3) that the "agreement" between Attorney
and Company was an agreement made by one legal entity with
itself. I cannot conceive of a majority of this court sanctioning the use of a void and illegal contract as evidence in a case
which arose ont of that particular void contract. But by its
holding here a majority of this court not only judicially sanctions an obvious wrong, hut, in effect, allows the wrongdoer
to retain both the fruits of his wrong, a bonus for his wrongdoing, and his expenses incident thereto!

4,

Conclusions
We have this case before us because of the holding of the
District Court of Appeal (117 Cal.App.2d 519) that the
Agreement was illegal, void and of no effect because it was
in violation of section 1101 of the Insurance Code. Section
1106 of the same code makes any violation of section 1101 a
misdemeanor. The District Court of Appeal held that the
Agreement, since it was made contrary to the terms of a law
designed for the protection of the public and which prescribed
a penalty for its violation, was illegal, void and of no effect.
There can be no question but that the same rule of law
should be applied here as this court, speaking through Mr.
,Justice Shenk, appliPi! i:1 t1: e~1"e of Contmctor's etc. Assn. v.
California Comp. Ins. Co .. 48 Cie1.2d 71, 76 [307 P.2d 626],
and which was a unanimous derision. It was there held: "Acceptance or receipt of an unlawful rebate is a misdemeanor.
Code, § 752.) Violation of the minimum rating law is also
a misdemeanor. (Ins. Code, § 11742,) This court said in
0
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a
to
contract founded upon
is void."
foregoing rule to the facts of the case at
we have a situation where
means of a contract
an object
prohibited by a
law"
the
and assets
and void because the
of Exchange. That contract was
act of
into it constituted a crime. Such being the
case the subscribers of
should have the right to
recover
of value which Company
under
such illegal and void contract together with the increment
thereof.
in the interest of justice,
The judgment in this case
be reversed with directions to the trial court which cannot
be misunderstood. Such directions should encompass all the
issues raised and should be for an accounting to determine:
1. The net profits made by
from business directly
traceable to former
business. The trial court should
retain jurisdiction so that the net profits accruing from year
to year which are directly traceable to Exchange business may
be judicially ascertained and awarded to Exchange subscribers;
2. The Special Surplus Fund comprising the investment
earnings of Exchange prior to its illegal take-over by Company and amounting at the time of trial to the sum of
$711,769.68 should be awarded to Exchange subscribers together with the increment thereof.
3. The Attorney-in-Fact fees, amounting to the sum of
$324,751.07, at the time of
should be awarded to Exchange subscribers. The direction to the trial court to ascertain the net
attributable to
business would
its actual expenses in conducting the business
traceable to former
subscribers.
I agree that the
or refusal to award, interest
on unliquidated amounts is a matter generally held to be
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Ins. & Trust Oo. v.
Wheeler v. Bolton. 92
122 Cal.App.2d
Inc. v. Palermo, 121
may not participate
except as <OOunsel for
consent or the court may
,Johnson's
were fully
counsel for the main stockholders (Mann v.
53
280 [127 P.2d 970] ).
For the reasons heretofore set forth it should be clear to
every
person that the
should be reversed
with dear directions to the trial court for its guidance on the
retrial.
The
of defendants and appellants for a rehearing
was denied November
1957. Gibson. C.•]., Cart"'r .•L. and
Traynor,
were of the
that the petition should be
granted.

A. No. 24622.

In Bank.

Nov. 1, 1957.]

lm liECCA RILEY, as

etc., Petitioner, v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUN'rY,
Respondent; NAOMI BLAIR RUOl!'F et al., Real Parties
in Interest.

Courts-Jurisdiction-Scope and Extent.--Where a tribunal
has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, the jurisdiction continues until a final judgment is entered.
[2] Appeal-Remittitur-Effect of Issuance.-After a remittitur
has been issued by order of the appellate court and has gone
down in accordance with Code Civ. Proc., § 958, the jurisdiction of the appellate court over the action is then revested in
the trial court.
§ 90; Am.Jur., Courts, § 159 et seq.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d,
and Error, § 673.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d,
McK. Dig. References:
"'tourts, § 22; [2] Appeal and Error,
§ 1730; [3, 8] Guardian and Ward,§ 102; [4] Guardian and Ward,
§ 49; [5] Guardian and
§ 100; [6] Trusts, § 358; (7]
Guardian and Ward, § 97;
Guardian and Ward, § 97.

